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NOTES

Forced to Flee and Forced to
Repatriate? How the Cessation
Clause of Article 1C(5) and (6) of
the 1951 Refugee
Convention
Operates in International Law
and Practice
ABSTRACT

The purpose of refugee law is to provide international
protection for vulnerable people who are denied state protection.
In fulfilling this purpose, the United Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and asylum states have
different legal foundations and implementing materials. When
terminating refugee status and protection under the 1951
Refugee Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, the
obligations and legal authoritiesof UNHCR and asylum states
differ.
The UNHCR implementing statute allows the
facilitation of voluntary repatriationwhen refugees can return
in safety and with dignity. In contrast, host states are able to
mandate repatriationwhen a change in circumstances occurs in
the country of origin. The different evidentiary thresholds for
voluntary and mandated repatriation have created deep
confusion regardingstates' ability to end refugee status and the
UNHCR's role in facilitating returns. This Note proposes
placing voluntary and mandated repatriation on a timeline
contingent on developments in the country of origin. Using the
current displacement of Rwandan refugees from Uganda as a
case study, this Note reconciles the conflicting standards in
internationallaw through this timeline.

711

712

VANDERBILT/OURNAL

OF TRANSNATIONAL

LAW

[VOL, 44:711

TABLE OF CONTENTS
I.
II.
III.

IV.

......................................
INTRODUCTION
1951 REFUGEE CONVENTION AND THE AUTHORITY
OFUNHCR
.........................................
THE 1951 REFUGEE CONVENTION CESSATION
.............................................
CLAUSE
UNHCR's STATUTORY REQUIREMENT TO FACILITATE
.........................
VOLUNTARY REPATRIATION..

A.
B.
V.

MANDATED REPATRIATION

A.
B.
C.

VI.
VII.

715
717
719

719
721

............................ 723

UNHCR Guidelines for DeclaringCessation
724
Under the 1951 Refugee Convention...........
State Practice Under the Ceased
...................726
Circumstances Provision
The "CompellingReasons" Exception to
729
....................
Mandatory Repatriation.

HARMONIZING MANDATORY REPATRIATION WITH
731
UNHCR's PRINCIPLE OF VOLUNTARY REPATRIATION..
...................... 734
RWANDAN REFUGEES IN UGANDA

A.
B.
C.

D.
VIII.

Ending UNHCR Protection:Voluntary
Repatriation as a Durable Solution..................
UNHCR Guidelines for Promoting
Voluntary Repatriation ....................

713

Background of Rwandan Refugees in Uganda.
Comparing UNHCR Promotionof
Voluntary Repatriation of Rwandan
............
Refugees with UNHCR Guidelines
Evaluating Uganda'sActions Under
UNHCR Guidelines and the Precedent
..........................
of State Practice
1.
Fundamental Change .................
2.
Durable Change
.....................
Effective Protection ...................
3.
...........
Recommended Action...........

CONCLUSION

........................................

735
738
739
739
740
741
742
743

2011]

FORCED TO FLEE AND FORCED TO REPATRIATE?

713

1. INTRODUCTION
The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)
estimates that ten million refugees exist worldwide.' Eighty percent
reside in developing countries.2
Over half of all refugees are
considered to be "protracted"-the conflict that caused them to flee
their home country has remained unresolved for five or more years.3
International protection substitutes for national protection as long as
refugee status is maintained.4
The legal authority for international protection is located in
three foundational documents. States' legal obligations are found in
the 1951 Refugee Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees
(1951 Refugee Convention) and the 1967 Protocol Relating to the
Status of Refugees (1967 Protocol). These instruments require state
parties to grant refugees rights and provide additional safeguards
regarding assets, travel, and employment, among others.5 The third
foundational instrument is the UNHCR statute. In conjunction with
states' legal obligations, UNHCR is tasked with providing
international protection to refugees and supervising host-state
responsibilities. 6
These different legal authorities place affirmative obligations on
host states and UNHCR that overlap harmoniously, with the notable
exception of the cessation of international protection. The UNHCR
statute and the 1951 Refugee Convention divide into two distinct
structures when governing cessation of refugee status. Under its
statute, UNHCR may effect voluntary repatriation, on both an
individual and group basis.7
First, individual refugees can
voluntarily cease protection under the 1951 Refugee Convention by

1.
Refugee Figures, UNHCR-UN REFUGEE AGENCY, http://www.unhcr.org/
pages/49c3646c1d.html (last visited Apr. 19, 2011).
2.
Press Release, U.N. High Comm'r for Refugees [UNHCR], UNHCR Annual
Report Shows 42 Million People Uprooted Worldwide (June 16, 2009), available at
http://www.unhcr.org/4a2fd52412d.html.

3.

Id.

4.
UNHCR, HANDBOOK ON PROCEDURES AND CRITERIA FOR DETERMINING
REFUGEE STATUS UNDER THE 1951 CONVENTION AND THE 1967 PROTOCOL RELATING TO

THE STATUS OF REFUGEES, T 115, 118, 135, U.N. Doc. HCR/IP/4/Eng/REV.1 (1967)
(reedited 1992) [hereinafter REFUGEE HANDBOOK].
5.
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, arts. 12-24, July 28, 1951,
entered into force Apr. 22, 1954, 189 U.N.T.S. 150 [hereinafter 1951 Refugee
Convention].
6.
Statute of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for
Refugees, G.A. Res. 428 (V), U.N. GAOR, 5th Sess., Supp. No. 20, T 1, at 46, U.N. Doc.
A11775 (Dec. 14, 1950) [hereinafter UNHCR Statute]; 1951 Refugee Convention, supra
note 5, art. 35.
7.
UNHCR Statute, supra note 6,
1, 8(c); see generally VOLUNTARY
REPATRIATION: INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION, ch. 1.6 (1996) [hereinafter VOLUNTARY

REPATRIATION
repatriation).

HANDBOOK]

(summarizing

UNHCR's

methods

for

voluntary
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taking affirmative steps to reacquire their nationality or a new
nationality, re-availing themselves of the protection of their home
country, or reestablishing themselves in the country that they left.8
Second, if UNHCR determines that refugees can return "in safety and
with dignity," UNHCR may actively promote voluntary repatriation
programs to large groups of refugees, eventually ending UNHCR
protection.9
In contrast, asylum states can revoke international protection by
activating a cessation clause. Article 1C(5) and (6) of the 1951
Refugee Convention allows states to cease refugee status when a
change in circumstances takes place in the country of origin that ends
the fear of persecution causing flight.1 0 State cessation of refugee
status is termed "mandated repatriation." This option is not well
developed in international practice.1 1
UNHCR has set forth
for
evaluating whether
criteria
states
can
use
recommended
2
fundamental change has occurred.1
However, UNHCR's
interpretations of the 1951 Refugee Convention obligations, while
authoritative, are not binding on states.13 As this Note demonstrates,
the legal requirements states must satisfy to mandate repatriation
under the 1951 Refugee Convention are not clear, and confusion
exists at the intersection of voluntary and mandated repatriation.
Even when UNHCR begins coordinating voluntary repatriation
with a specified group of refugees, host-state obligations under the
1951 Refugee Convention may continue because the evidentiary
requirements to mandate repatriation may be higher than the

1951 Refugee Convention, supranote 5, art. IC(1)-(4).
See VOLUNTARY REPATRIATION HANDBOOK, supra note 7, ch. 1.6 (stating
the current UNHCR mandate to promote "the voluntary repatriation of refugees once
conditions are conducive to return").
10.
1951 Refugee Convention, supra note 5, art. 1C(5)-(6).
11.
See Susan Kneebone and Maria O'Sullivan, Article 1 C 1951 Convention, in
8.
9.

THE 1951 CONVENTION RELATING TO THE STATUS OF REFUGEES AND ITS 1967
PROTOCOL: A COMMENTARY 513 (Andreas Zimmermann ed., 2011) (noting that "there is

relatively little older jurisprudence on Art. 1 C, para. 5," and much of the jurisprudence
in existence concerns non-recognized refugees).
12.
See UNHCR, GUIDELINES ON INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION: CESSATION OF
REFUGEE STATUS UNDER ARTICLE 1C(5) AND (6) OF THE 1951 CONVENTION RELATING TO
t
10-12, U.N. Doc. HCRIGIP/03/03 (Feb. 10, 2003)
THE STATUS OF REFUGEES,
[hereinafter GUIDELINES ON INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION).

13.
See James Hathaway, The Right of States to Repatriate Former Refugees,
20 OHIO ST. J. ON Disp. RESOL. 175, 204-06 (2005).
While all states have the sovereign authority to allow any person they wish to
remain on their territory and while it will often be humane and right to extend
such generosity, this is not a matter fairly understood to be required by either
the text or purposes of the refugee law.
Id. (footnote omitted).
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requirements necessary to support voluntary repatriation.14 When
host states mandate repatriation under the authority of the 1951
Refugee Convention, this action can clash with UNHCR's statutory
obligation to implement voluntary repatriation and place UNHCR or
host states in danger of violating international law.
This Note harmonizes voluntary repatriation and mandatory
repatriation by placing these options on a continuum, dependent
upon positive developments in the country of origin and an end of the
Reading UNHCR
fear of persecution that caused flight.
interpretations and recommendations in the aggregate, UNHCR
creates a linear progression of steps toward cessation of refugee
status. By placing UNHCR interpretive guidelines on a timeline,
voluntary repatriation becomes a necessary, but not sufficient
condition in the progression toward mandatory repatriation, instead
of operating as a competing and distinct option. Part I presents the
background the 1951 Refugee Convention and UNHCR's role in
refugee protection. Part II outlines the 1951 Refugee Convention
cessation clause. Part III sets forth UNHCR's statutory obligation to
support voluntary repatriation. Part IV details the cessation of
international protection under the 1951 Refugee Convention,
examining the authority of states to mandate repatriation and the
Syncing
guidelines UNHCR sets forth for this determination.
voluntary and mandated repatriation measured against progress in
the country of origin, Part V recommends that UNHCR articulate this
timeline as its interpretation of the 1951 Refugee Convention and
actively promote state adherence. Part VI applies this analysis to the
current situation of Rwandan refugees living in Uganda and
Uganda's invocation of mandated repatriation.

II. 1951 REFUGEE CONVENTION AND THE AUTHORITY OF UNHCR
The 1951 Refugee Convention categorized two types of refugees:
Article 1A(1) refers to people classified as refugees pre-1939; Article
1A(2) refers to those who have a well-founded fear of being persecuted
"due to race, religion, membership of a particular social group or
political opinion" and because of this fear cannot avail themselves of
the protection of their country of origin.' 5
The 1951 Refugee

14.
VOLUNTARY REPATRIATION HANDBOOK, supra note 7, ch. 2.2. UNHCR
states two reasons why voluntary repatriation can occur at a lower threshold of change.
First, the change of circumstances requirement "implies the consolidation, over time, of
a process of stabilization." Id. Second, the voluntary nature of this choice is "the core
element in promoting and facilitating repatriation." Id.
15.
See 1951 Refugee Convention, supra note 5, art. 1A(1)-(2) (showing that, as
originally signed, Article 1A(2) limited the definition to events occurring before
January 1951).
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Convention retroactively applied to refugees granted status under the
League of Nations and replaced the authority of the instruments that
originally granted that status.16 The 1967 Protocol removed the
temporal limitations in the 1951 Refugee Convention, thereby
preserving the continual authority of the 1951 Refugee Convention.' 7
The 1951 Refugee Convention granted UNHCR the statutory
authority to declare refugee status and facilitate asylum.' 8 A grant of
refugee status triggers UNHCR's responsibilities, first, to allocate
resources to alleviate the immediate crisis, and second, to seek a
permanent solution for refugees.' 9
Articulated in Article 35,
UNHCR's role in this process is supervisory, and necessarily
dependent on host-state cooperation:2 0
The contracting States undertake to co-operate with the office of the
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, or any other agency
of the United Nations which may succeed it, in the exercise of its
functions, and shall in particular facilitate its duty of supervising the
21
application of the provisions of this convention.

"Supervision," as envisioned and enacted by UNHCR, encompasses a
range of activities, including protection efforts, daily field activities,
overseeing state action, organizing aid, and monitoring
nongovernmental organization (NGO) work. 22 Article 35 is thus
UNHCR's legal authority in requesting states to accept UNHCR's role
in protection, provide UNHCR with information, and adhere to
UNHCR policy statements. 23
UNHCR's work in host countries is multifaceted. When a
refugee crisis first arises, UNHCR supervises the application of
international conventions, 24 and coordinates the admission of
refugees and the transfer of refugee assets to host countries. 25 For
the duration of convention protection, UNHCR works to improve the

16.
David Milner, Exemption from Cessation of Refugee Status in the Second
Sentence of Article 1C(5)/(6) of the 1951 Refugee Convention, 16 INT'L J. REFUGEE L. 91,
94 (2004).
Id.; Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, art. 1(2), Jan. 31, 1967, 606
17.
U.N.T.S. 267 [hereinafter 1967 Protocol].
1951 Refugee Convention, supranote 5, pmbl. paras. 5-6.
18.
UNHCR Statute, supra note 6, T 1.
19.
1951 Refugee Convention, supra note 5, art. 35; 1967 Protocol, supra note
20.
17, art. 2.
1951 Refugee Convention, supra note 5, art. 35.
21.
22.
Walter Kalin, Supervising the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of
Refugees: Article 35 and Beyond, in REFUGEE PROTECTION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW:
UNHCR's GLOBAL CONSULTATIONS ON INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION 615 (Feller et al.
eds., 2008) [hereinafter REFUGEE PROTECTION].
Id. at 619.
23.
UNHCR Statute, supra note 6, T 8(a).
24.
25.
Id. T 8(d).
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general situation of refugees and meet their material needs. 26 Article
35 expands state cooperation to all these functions of the High
Commissioner, not just treaty cooperation. 27 As Walter Kalin states:
By establishing a duty on States Parties to cooperate with UNHCR in
the exercise of its functions, Article 35(1) of the 1951 Refugee
Convention does not refer to a specific and limited set of functions but
to all tasks that UNHCR has under its mandate or might be entrusted
with at a given time. Thus, the cooperation duties follow the changing
28
role of UNHCR.

These cooperation duties become muddled when UNHCR or host
states seek to facilitate refugee returns because UNHCR statutory
requirements are different than the 1951 Refugee Convention
requirements.

III.

THE 1951 REFUGEE CONVENTION CESSATION CLAUSE

Once refugee status is conferred, that status remains unless
individual refugees re-avail themselves of the protection of their
home country 29 or a third party (UNHCR or the host state) invokes a
Withdrawal of refugee status declares that
cessation clause. 30
international protection is no longer necessary and ends refugee
31
rights and benefits conferred by the 1951 Refugee Convention.
Contracting states have a duty not to return refugees if their "life or
freedom would be threatened on account of race, religion, nationality,
membership [in] a particular social group, or political opinion"
(mirroring the persecution requirement in Article 1A(2)). 32 Encoded
in Article 33 of the 1951 Refugee Convention, this duty of
nonrefoulement is legally binding on state parties. UNHCR states
that involuntary repatriation "would in practice amount to
refoulement."3 3

8(b), (d), (i), 10 (outlining the mandates through which the High
See id.
26.
Commissioner must "provide for the protection of refugees falling under the
competence of his office," and requiring the High Commissioner to administer any
funds "he receives for assistance to refugees" to the private and public agencies "he
deems best qualified to administer such assistance").
Kalin, supranote 22, at 616-17.
27.
28.
Id. at 617.
1951 Refugee Convention, supra note 5, art. IC(1)-(4); REFUGEE
29.
114-15.
HANDBOOK, supra note 4,
1951 Refugee Convention, supra note 5, art. 1C(5)-(6); UNHCR Statute,
30.
supranote 6, 6(A)(ii)(e).
UNHCR, Note on CessationClauses, 6, U.N. Doc. EC/47/SC/CRP.30 (May
31.
30, 1997) [hereinafter Note on Cessation], available at http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/
docid/47fdfafld.html.
32.
1951 Refugee Convention, supra note 5, arts. 1A(2), 33(1).
33.

VOLUNTARY REPATRIATION HANDBOOK, supra note 7, ch. 2.3.

UNHCR

materials seem to be in tension regarding mandatory repatriation. While this quote
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In facilitating the end of convention protection, UNHCR may
implement voluntary repatriation. 34 Paragraph 6(A)(ii)(e) of the
UNHCR statute provides that "the competence of the High
Commissioner" ceases to apply to a refugee when the circumstances
causing him to be recognized as a refugee have changed, and no other
grounds exist that prohibit him from availing himself of the
protection of his country of origin.35 When UNHCR determines that
such a change has occurred, UNHCR implements large-scale
voluntary repatriation programs.36
In contrast, the 1951 Refugee Convention allows host states to
determine an end to refugee status and mandate repatriation. Article
1C(5) and (6) of the 1951 Refugee Convention provides for cessation of
refugee status in the following circumstances:
(5) He can no longer, because the circumstances in connection with
which he has been recognized as a refugee have ceased to exist,
continue to refuse to avail himself of the protection of the country of his
nationality ...
(6) Being a person who has no nationality he is, because the
circumstances in connection with which he has been recognized as a
refugee have ceased to exist, able to return to the country of his former
37
habitual residence.

While the duty of nonrefoulement prohibits states from returning
persons recognized as refugees under international law,38 Article
IC(5) and (6) allows states to mandate return, on an individual and
group basis, when the fear of persecution is eliminated and
circumstances in the country of origin have improved such that
national protection is available.3 9 As will be described in detail in
Part IV, the evidentiary burden states must meet to move from

from the Voluntary Repatriation Handbook implies that involuntary repatriation is
always refoulement, UNHCR has also said that mandated repatriation does not need
the refugee's consent. UNHCR, Statement on the "Ceased Circumstances" Clause of
the EC Qualification Directive, § 2.1 (Aug. 2008) [hereinafter UNHCR Statement],
Additionally,
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/48a2f0782.html.
available at
UNHCR has published guidelines governing the process of mandated repatriation. See
GUIDELINES ON INTERNATIONAL

PROTECTION, supra note

12. From this, one may

logically infer that if a state satisfies UNHCR guidelines governing mandated
repatriation, involuntary repatriation would therefore not amount to refoulement.
See UNHCR Statute, supra note 6, 1 1 (noting the goal of the UNHCR "to
34.
facilitate the voluntary repatriation of [| refugees"); id. T 8(c) (mandating that UNHCR
"[aissist[ governmental and private efforts to promote voluntary repatriation").
35.
Id. T 6(A)(ii)(e).
See VOLUNTARY REPATRIATION HANDBOOK, supra note 7, ch. 3 (outlining
36.
the process UNHCR uses to determine when voluntary repatriation programs are
appropriate).
1951 Refugee Convention, supra note 5, art. 1C(5)-(6).
37.
Id. art. 33(1).
38.
Id. art. 1C(5)-(6); see also VOLUNTARY REPATRIATION HANDBOOK, supra
39.
note 7, ch. 1.2 (noting that a reestablishing of national protection is part of the inquiry
on whether a fear of persecution has ceased).

2011]

FORCED TO FLFE AND FORCED TO REPATRIATE?

719

refoulement to properly mandated repatriation-from illegal to legal
action-is unclear in international law and state practice.
Combining these cessation provisions, Joan Fitzpatrick
summarizes the five contexts in which cessation occurs:
(i) cessation of UNHCR protection under the Statute; (ii) cessation of
State protection of refugees previously recognized on a group basis; (iii)
individualized cessation for recognized refugees; (iv) withdrawal of
temporary protection; and (v) denial of initial claims to asylum based
40
upon changed conditions between flight and status determination.

While cessation of status is provided for in these international
instruments, the temporal boundaries of refugee protection are not
clearly delineated in international law. 4 1
The 1951 Refugee Convention cessation clause and the UNHCR
statutory cessation provision each require a change in circumstances
that negates the need for international protection. It remains unclear
whether the degree of change required to facilitate voluntary
repatriation and to mandate repatriation are the same.42 UNHCR
maintains that the evidentiary threshold for mandating repatriation
is much higher than the threshold for implementing voluntary
State jurisprudence is not uniform on the
repatriation. 43
interpretation of international requirements for repatriation.
However, UNHCR requirements and state practice can be
harmonized by understanding voluntary repatriation to serve as a
benchmark toward mandated repatriation.

IV. UNHCR'S STATUTORY

REQUIREMENT TO
REPATRIATION
VOLUNTARY
FACILITATE

A. Ending UNHCR Protection:Voluntary Repatriation
as a Durable Solution
Under the UNHCR statute, UNHCR must "provide a legal
44
framework for discontinuation of UNHCR protection" and support
voluntary repatriation. 45 Voluntary repatriation of former refugees is
UNHCR's preferred method of ending refugee protection, as opposed

Joan Fitzpatrick & Rafael Bonoan, Cessation of Refugee Protection, in
40.
REFUGEE PROTECTION, supranote 22, at 492.
See Hathaway, supra note 13, at 175, 182-84 (addressing the "conceptual
41.
void" states face when seeking to implement repatriation).
See generally VOLUNTARY REPATRIATION HANDBOOK, supra note 7, ch. 2.2
42.
(stating that voluntary repatriation can occur at a lower threshold of change);
Hathaway, supra note 13, at 175, 200, 211-12 (discussing this confusion in standards
and ultimately disagreeing with UNHCR that a higher threshold is legally necessary).
VOLUNTARY REPATRIATION HANDBOOK, supra note 7, ch. 2.2.
43.
Note on Cessation,supranote 31, 31.
44.
45.
UNHCR Statute, supranote 6, 1.
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to local integration and resettlement. 46 The scope of UNHCR
repatriation efforts occurs in stages.
UNHCR will facilitate
repatriation at the individual refugee's request even if it does not
think the situation is objectively safe for returns. 4 7
Two
considerations justify this lower threshold. First, the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights provides that every person has a right
to return to his or her own country.48 This principle is the foundation
for facilitating voluntary return.4 9 Second, change in the country of
origin occurs over time, and at certain points returning becomes an
option for particular groups even when returning remains unsafe for
other refugees.5 0 UNHCR-facilitated individual, voluntary returns
are therefore not sufficient indicators that conditions in the country of
origin have improved to such a degree that all fear of persecution is
negated.
When changes in the country of origin satisfy UNHCR
requirements,
UNHCR
considers
implementing
voluntary
repatriation programs.5 1
This consideration arises in three
contexts. 52 Substantial changes in a country of origin may convince
UNHCR to promote the voluntary repatriation of refugees and
discontinue assistance programs. 53 UNHCR also reviews refugee
caseloads and, in the course of this review, may reevaluate the need
for protection. 54 Finally, UNHCR responds to inquiries from state
parties seeking reevaluation and advises governments based on its
own initiative.5 5 If promotion of voluntary repatriation is successful,
UNHCR may consider declaring the cessation of statutory protection
under criteria provided in paragraph 6(A)(ii)(e) of its statute. 56 In
these circumstances, host states cannot automatically declare
cessation under the 1951 Refugee Convention. 57 "The burden rests on

46.
Hathaway, supra note 13, at 180.
47.
VOLUNTARY REPATRIATION HANDBOOK, supra note 7, ch. 3.1.
48.
Id. ch. 2.1.
49.
Id. The 1951 Refugee Convention also lists several additional international
instruments that reflect this right to return. 1951 Refugee Convention, supra note 5,
pmbl. Related rights, such as a right to a nationality, also support this principle. For a
definition of "voluntary" in the context of repatriation, see VOLUNTARY REPATRIATION
HANDBOOK, supranote 7, ch. 2.3.
50.
See VOLUNTARY REPATRIATION HANDBOOK, supra note 7, chs. 2.2, 3.1
(supporting the notion that change in the country of origin occurs over time, and each
refugee's individual circumstances impact a cessation determination as well as
UNHCR's promotion of voluntary repatriation).
51.
Id. ch. 3.1.
52.
Fitzpatrick & Bonoan, supra note 40, at 499-511. Fitzpatrick and Bonoan
list several examples of each evaluation. See id.
53.
Id. at 499.
54.
Id. at 500.
55.
Id.
56.
UNHCR Statute, supra note 6, 1 6(A)(ii)(e).
57.
Note on Cessation, supra note 31, 11 33-34; UNHCR, Executive Committee
Conclusion No. 69 (XLIII), Cessation of Status, $T (a)-(b) [hereinafter Cessation of
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the country of asylum [to show] that . . . an invocation of Article IC(5)

or (6) is appropriate."5 8
UNHCR applied the ceased circumstances provision of its statute
in only twenty-five instances from 1973 to 2008.59 Each time, the
provision was invoked because significant political changes had
Fitzpatrick
occurred and democratic rule was instituted.6 0
categorizes the circumstances in which UNHCR has invoked
cessation into three groups: (i) accession to independent statehood; (ii)
achievement of a successful transition to democracy; and (iii)
resolution of a civil conflict.6 1 UNHCR has provided two reasons for
this limited application. 62
First, alternative solutions, such as
encouraging voluntary repatriation on an individual basis, limit the
Second, the requisite
need to invoke the cessation clause. 63
determination-whether a fundamental, durable change has
occurred, ending the fear of persecution-is difficult and resource
intensive. 64
B. UNHCR Guidelines for Promoting Voluntary Repatriation
In the context of repatriation, "voluntariness" is the absence of
physical, psychological, or material pressure. 65 In the Handbook on
Voluntary Repatriation, UNHCR sets forth two overarching
principles governing voluntary returns that enshrine this definition: 66
Repatriation must be carried out "in safety and with dignity."6 7 A
safe and dignified return is one "without harassment, arbitrary
A return "in safety" requires
detention, or physical threats."68
physical safety, legal safety, and material security. 6 9 Physical safety
includes protection from armed attacks, and the absence of land

Status], available at http://www.unher.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/search?page=search&doc
id=3ae68c431c&query=%22executive%20committee%20conclusion%20no.%2069%22.
UNHCR actions are instructive, but not sufficient.
58.
GUIDELINES ON INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION, supra note 12, 25(ii).
59.
UNHCR Statement, supra note 33, Intro. For a detailed list, see generally
32; and Fitzpatrick & Bonoan, supra note 40, at
Note on Cessation, supra note 31,
501.
60.
Note on Cessation,supranote 31, 1 32.
Fitzpatrick & Bonoan, supra note 40, at 501.
61.
62.
GUIDELINES ON INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION, supra note 12, 3.
63.
Id.
Fitzpatrick & Bonoan, supra note 40, at 501. This is the authors' viewpoint
64.
and not the expressed view of UNHCR.
65.
VOLUNTARY REPATRIATION HANDBOOK, supra note 7, ch. 2.3.
66.
Id. ch. 2.4.
67.
Id.
68.
Id.
69.
Id.
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mines along the refugees' route of return.70 Countries of origin can
demonstrate advances in legal safety by "amnesties, public
assurances of personal safety, integrity, non-discrimination and
freedom from fear of persecution or punishment upon return."7 1
Given that the goal of refugee law is to fill in the void created by
the absence of state protection with international protection, legal
safety ensures that international protection can cease because
returning refugees are accorded rights as citizens. 72
Material
security includes "access to land or means of livelihood."73 This prong
involves investigation into whether refugees can thrive upon return.
To this end, refugees should be allowed to return with possessions
acquired while living in the asylum country. 74
A return with dignity ensures that the country of origin restores
and protects former refugees' rights.75 This element is less tangible
than safety, and encompasses benchmarks that reflect respect and
honor.76
Examples include allowing family members to return
together, protecting vulnerable returnees, and ensuring freedom of
movement.7 7 Refugees should have access to resources and be treated
equally with other nationals as they integrate into the national
community.78
To ensure that these principles are satisfied, UNHCR requires
fulfillment of several preconditions before it will promote voluntary
repatriation as a durable solution. First, the country must have
undergone an "overall general improvement" to the degree that
UNHCR believes that the return will be in safety and with dignity.79
Second, the host state, country of origin, and refugee must agree that
the return is voluntary.80
The legal status of refugees in host
countries is an important factor in considering true voluntariness.8 '
If refugees' rights are not recognized and they are confined in camps,

70.
Id. Recognizing that it may be infeasible to provide a mine-free route, the
Voluntary Repatriation Handbook states, "if not mine-free then at least demarcated
settlement sites." Id.
71.
Id.
115, 118, 135.
72.
REFUGEE HANDBOOK, supra note 4,
73.
VOLUNTARY REPATRIATION HANDBOOK, supra note 7, ch. 2.4.
74.
Id. ch. 2.4. UNHCR includes compensation for movable and immovable
property refugees left behind in the host country, though this benchmark is phrased
more as a suggestion rather than a requirement. Id. ch. 3.6.
75.
Id.
76.
See Hathaway, supra note 13, at 207. Hathaway points out several
problems with UNHCR terms, suggesting that it link these requirements to other
international legal instruments that governments' respect.
77.
VOLUNTARY REPATRIATION HANDBOOK, supra note 7, ch. 2.4.
Id. ch. 6.4.
78.
79.
Id. ch. 3.1.
Id.
80.
81.
Id. ch. 2.3.
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it is less likely that the decision to repatriate is voluntary.82 In
addition, UNHCR must have unimpeded access to refugees.8 3
Finally, the terms of the repatriation must be formalized in an
agreement between UNHCR and the countries involved. 84 If these
conditions are satisfied, UNHCR will undertake a campaign to
promote repatriation.8 5
One striking difference between mandatory and voluntary
repatriation is the role of the country of origin. Before implementing
voluntary repatriation programs, UNHCR requires a high level of
cooperation with the government of the country of origin. It must
formally guarantee the ability of refugees to return safely. 86 In
addition to this formal guarantee, the government must provide
travel documents and proof of citizenship for returnees and their
children.8 7 The government must agree to allow UNHCR to monitor
88
In
returnees, ensuring that national protection is adequate.
contrast, no similar requirements are present when host states
choose to mandate repatriation.

V. MANDATED REPATRIATION

As set forth above, UNHCR implements voluntary repatriation
programs, dependent on positive changes in the country of origin. In
contrast, states can mandate repatriation without the consent of
refugees. 89 UNHCR has put forth requirements states should follow
when determining if mandating repatriation, and therefore ceasing
international protection, is appropriate.9 0 Though not extensively
used in state practice, state jurisprudence interpreting UNHCR
guidelines is not clear. This section details the conflict between
UNHCR recommendations and state practice.

Id. ch. 2.3.
82.
Id., ch. 3.1.
83.
84.
Id.
Id.
85.
Id. ch. 1.4.
86.
Id. ch. 2.6.
87.
Id. chs. 1.6, 2.6.
88.
UNHCR Statement, supra note 33, § 2.1.
89.
See generally REFUGEE HANDBOOK, supra note 4 (outlining the basic
90.
principle that cessation of refugee status requires more than a determination that the
fear of persecution has ceased); GUIDELINES ON INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION, supra
note 12 (same); UNHCR Statement, supra note 33 (same).
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A. UNHCR Guidelines for Declaring Cessation
Under the 1951 Refugee Convention
As the agency tasked with supervising the 1951 Refugee
Convention, UNHCR guidelines are instructive in interpreting
convention requirements. The overarching principle is that cessation
of protection under the 1951 Refugee Convention arises when a
change takes place in the country of origin, "which can be assumed to
remove the basis of the fear of persecution."9 1 According to UNHCR,
for a state to mandate repatriation and invoke Article IC(5) and (6) of
the convention, thereby ceasing international protection, the host
state must determine that changes are fundamental and durable, and
effective protection must be available in the country of origin.9 2
Changes that qualify as "fundamental" most often involve an end to
hostilities and a political change resulting in a return to peace and
stability.93 This type of change is supported by significant reforms
that alter the basic legal or social structure of the state, including
"democratic elections, declarations of amnesties, repeal of oppressive
law and dismantling of former security services." 9" If a society
undergoes a change that eliminates the original cause of the fear of
persecution, but the change creates a new fear of persecution that
could potentially give rise to refugee status, the cessation clause
cannot be invoked.9 5
Additionally, UNHCR maintains that the change must be
durable and stable. 9 6 UNHCR cautions that a change is not durable
if the country's political and economic climate is currently in flux or is
still potentially volatile.9 7 UNHCR recommends that host states wait
a minimum of twelve to eighteen months after a fundamental change
is implemented before determining whether the change is durable.9 8
If the change was undertaken violently, a longer timeframe is
appropriate.9 9 "The process of national reconstruction must be given

91.
33,

§ 2.2;

REFUGEE HANDBOOK, supra note 4, 1 135; UNHCR Statement, supra note
GUIDELINES ON INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION, supra note 12, IT 10-12.

92.
UNHCR Statement, supra note 33, § 2.2; see also GUIDELINES ON
INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION, supra note 12,
10-16 (elaborating on the operation of
the aforementioned triggering criteria).
93.

GUIDELINES ON INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION, supra note 12,

1

11; Note on

Cessation, supranote 31, 1 20.
Note on Cessation, supra note 31, 1 20.
94.
95.
GUIDELINES ON INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION, supra note 12, 1 12.
96.
Note on Cessation, supra note 31,
20-21; GUIDELINES ON
INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION, supra note 12, IT 13-14.
97.
Note on Cessation, supra note 31, 1 21; GUIDELINES ON INTERNATIONAL
PROTECTION, supra note 12, 11 13-14; UNHCR Statement, supra note 33, § 2.1.
98.
Note on Cessation, supra note 31, 1 21. UNHCR notes that the average
time for fundamental enduring changes to take root is between four and five years. Id.
99.
GUIDELINES ON INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION, supra note 12,
13-14.
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sufficient time to take hold and any peace arrangements with
opposing militant groups must be carefully monitored."10 0
Finally, UNHCR requires that the home country be able to
provide effective protection, thus negating the need for international
protection.101 Under the UNHCR definition, effective protection
requires a functioning government and administrative structures, a
working law enforcement and justice system, and the ability of
returning refugees to access livelihoods.102 Large-scale voluntary
repatriation of refugees is one indicator that changes have
occurred.' 0 3 However, UNHCR notes that in instances when the
return of former refugees is likely to reignite tensions, repatriation
can actually indicate the absence of fundamental, durable changes.104
Analyzing whether these three factors-a fundamental, durable
change that establishes effective protection-eliminate the fear of
persecution that caused flight necessitates inquiry into whether other
international human rights norms are fulfilled. 0 5 In the UNHCR
Note on Cessation Clauses, specific factors include:
The right to life and liberty and to non-discrimination, independence of
the judiciary and fair and open trials which presume innocence, the
upholding of various basic rights and fundamental freedoms such as
the right to freedom of expression, association, peaceful assembly,
movement and access to courts, and the rule of law generally.106

Creating institutions to monitor human rights protection is a strong
07
indicator of a fundamental change.'
In determining the applicability of cessation, UNHCR interprets
Article 1C(5) and (6) to place an affirmative obligation on asylum
states to evaluate the conditions of the country of origin. Asylum
states must allocate resources for investigation and information
gathering to identify a fundamental, durable, and stable change that
eliminates the fear of persecution.108 Any state declaring cessation
should use numerous sources of evidence and include information
from both governmental and nongovernmental sources.' 0 9 UNHCR
recommends that refugee status review be infrequent, in conjunction
The burden of assessing
with refugees' need for stability.1 0

100.
101.
102.
Statement,

Id. 1 14.
Note on Cessation,supra note 31, 6.
GUIDELINES ON INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION, supra note 12,
supra note 33, §§ 4.2.1, 4.2.3.

103.

GUIDELINES ON INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION, supra note 12,

104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.

Id.
Note on Cessation, supra note 31, 23.
Id.
Id.
GUIDELINES ON INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION, supranote 12, 25(i)-(iii).
Id.; Cessation of Status, supra note 57, f (a)-(b).
REFUGEE HANDBOOK, supra note 4, 135; Note on Cessation,supra note 31,

6.

15; UNHCR
12.
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circumstances in the country of origin-combined with the increase in
administrative
costs of mandating repatriation-limits
the
application of this clause.'
If, after such an investigation has occurred, a host state chooses
to declare cessation, UNHCR insists that several procedural
guidelines be followed. Declarations of cessation must be public." 2
The host state must provide counseling and assistance to refugees," 3
allow adequate time to prepare for return, and respect the acquired
rights of long-term residents.11 4 Moreover, cessation of refugee status
does not automatically result in mandatory repatriation." 5 Invoking
cessation for a nationality group creates a rebuttable presumption
that cessation applies to individual members.116

B. State Practice Under the Ceased CircumstancesProvision
UNHCR and state parties seem to agree that the cessation
clause should be invoked cautiously." 7 In practice, the procedures
outlined above for applying the cessation clause are not well
developed.11 8 This gap in international law places refugees at high
risk of prematurely loosing protection and increases the burden on
asylum countries." 9 Additionally, state jurisprudence on Article
IC(5) to (6) is limited and inconsistent.
A few courts have articulated a much more narrow conception of
protection than the interpretation advanced by UNHCR. The High
Court of Australia, in The Minister for Immigration and
MulticulturalAffairs v. QAAH, found that when determining whether
a fear of persecution still exists, the refugee has the burden of proving
a continued fear of persecution.120 The court interpreted the 1951
Refugee Convention and domestic law to require Australia to extend
protection only to persons who continued to meet the definition set
forth in Article 1A(2), which governs the initial determination of

111.
Expert Roundtable, Lisbon, Port., May 3-4, 2001, Summary Conclusions:
Cessation of Refugee Status, f 1-2 (June 2003), available at http://www.unhcr.org/ref
world/publisher,CUP,THEMGUIDE,,470a33bcd,0.html.
112.

GUIDELINES ON INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION, supra note 12,

113.
114.
115.

Id.
Id.
Id.

116.

GUIDELINES ON INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION, supra note 12,

25(iv).

25(v).
25(vi).
25(ix); REFUGEE HANDBOOK, supranote 4, $ 136.
19; REFUGEE

HANDBOOK, supra note 4, 1 136.
117.
Fitzpatrick & Bonoan, supra note 40, at 498-99 (citing the Commission on
European communities and the policies of the Australian and Dutch governments as
examples of state policy that tracks UNHCR reasoning).
118.
Id. at 499.
119.
Hathaway, supra note 13, at 182-83.
120.
Kneebone & O'Sullivan, supra note 11, at 514 (citing Minister of
Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs v. QAAH (2006) 231 CLR 1
(Austl.)).
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refugee status.121 This understanding of the convention makes
refugee status evaluation and cessation determination the same
inquiry, rather than discrete procedures with separate evidentiary
requirements.122 The court construed the cessation clause to operate
automatically, in direct contradiction to UNHCR interpretation. 2 3
Most troubling, the court rejected the affirmative burden UNHCR
124
places on states to investigate a change in circumstances.
Likewise, Germany has interpreted this burden of protection
In 2008, the German Federal
narrowly in recent case law.
Administrative Court withdrew refugee status from an individual
because the court determined that the fear of persecution had
ceased.' 2 5 Echoing the reasoning of the High Court of Australia, the
German court articulated symmetry between the definition of
"refugee" set forth in Article 1A(2) and cessation in Article 1C(5).1 26
The court rejected the broad articulation of protection advanced by
UNHCR that includes an investigation into fundamental, durable
changes in the country of origin. 2 7
In an advisory opinion on the German cessation cases, the
European Court of Justice (ECJ) set forth a more inclusive
understanding of protection than that outlined by the German court,
but did not fully endorse UNHCR recommended guidelines.128 When
deciding whether a refugee should continue receiving protection, the
host country must determine whether the country of origin has a
functioning legal system and whether the individual in question will
have access to that system.12 9 The ECJ also recommended that the
host country take into account the basic human rights situation in
the country of origin.130 These standards are higher than the narrow
determination focusing solely on a fear of persecution, but still do not
reflect the breadth of UNHCR recommendations.

121.

Id.

122.
See id. (noting the mirrored standard between Article 1C(5) and 1A(2)).
Id. at 515. UNHCR states in several publications that cessation procedures
123.
must take into account the individual circumstances that caused flight, and therefore
refugees should not lose status without the opportunity for a hearing. See GUIDELINES
ON INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION, supra note 12, 19 (explaining the "general principle"
that all refugees should have the possibility for a continuation of status based on their
individual case); Note on Cessation,supra note 31, 1 7 ("[N]o refugee claim, whether for
granting of refugee status or for its continuation, should be rejected without an
individual assessment on its merits.").
124.
Kneebone & O'Sullivan, supra note 11, at 515 (citing QAAH, 231 CLR 1).
Id. at 516.
125.
126.
Id.
Id. For other academic criticisms of this understanding of the 1951 Refugee
127.
Convention, see id. at 516 n.283.
Id. at 517 (citing Joined Cases 175-179/08, Abdullah et al. v.
128.
Bundesrepublik Deutschland, 2010 E.C.R. 113/4).
129.
Id.
130.
Id.
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UNHCR responded by reiterating its much broader conception of
states' obligations under the 1951 Refugee Convention in its
statement on the ECJ ruling. In interpreting Article 1C(5), UNHCR
stated:
Application of the "ceased circumstances" clause should be informed by
the overall objective of refugee protection, which aims at finding
durable solutions for refugees. Durable solutions are integration in the
host State, resettlement to a third State and voluntary return to the
131
home State if this is possible in safety and dignity.

Notably absent from this list of durable solutions is mandatory
repatriation. Yet, UNHCR stated that application of Article IC(5)
and (6) does not require the consent or any voluntary act of the
refugee.132

The cases from Australia and Germany reflect an understanding
of protection that begins and ends with a fear of persecution. 3 3 In
contrast, UNHCR clarified that "protection," as envisioned in the
mandate, means more than an absence of persecution. 134 It requires
the availability of "effective protection," understood in the broad
sense of a stable, functioning state. 3 5 The purpose of refugee law
"entails protection against return to persecution (as enshrined in the
principle of nonrefoulement) and protection allowing for a life in
dignity in the host state."136 Therefore, when a host state applies
Article IC(5) of the 1951 Refugee Convention, the state declares that
the need for international protection no longer exists.1 37 Accordingly,
UNHCR maintains that cessation is not appropriate when protection
against persecution can be provided only with the help of
multinational forces.s3 8 The authority of non-state actors cannot be
substituted for the power of a state to effect the rule of law because
under international law, non-state actors are not accorded the same

131.
UNHCR Statement, supra note 33, § 2.1.
132.
Id.
133.
See Kneebone & O'Sullivan, supra note 11, at 514 (discussing the common
threads, but sometimes conflicting conclusions, between cases).
134.
See UNHCR Statement, supra note 33, § 4.1.2 (arguing that an "effective
protection" determination is broader than the grant of status in Article 1A(2) of the
1951 Refugee Convention). When determining cessation, UNHCR states that the
question is not whether the fear of persecution has ceased, but rather whether national
protection is sufficient. Note on Cessation,supra note 31, 1 25.
135.

GUIDELINES ON INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION, supra note 12,

1

15; see also

Note on Cessation, supra note 31, 1 25. Along with legal and physical safety, UNHCR
includes returnees' access to livelihoods when determining whether a state is
"functioning." Hathaway notes that this requirement is above what is guaranteed by
international human rights law, which includes only a right to basic necessities.
Hathaway, supra note 13, at 212-13.
136.
UNHCR Statement, supra note 33, § 4.1.2.
Id.
137.
Id. § 4.2.1.
138.
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rights and authority as state actors.139 As a result, their ability to
implement national, fundamental, durable change is necessarily
limited.
Other state parties to the 1951 Refugee Convention have hewed
closer to UNHCR's interpretation of the requirements for mandatory
repatriation, placing the evidentiary burden on the host country
during refugee status determinations. 14 0 United States immigration
regulations require the government to prove that a change in
circumstances has occurred, thereby eliminating the fear of
persecution.141 The refugee does not have to prove a continuing fear
of persecution. Similarly, United Kingdom policy documents and case
law place the evidentiary burden on the immigration authority to
establish that the individual's refugee status has ceased.1 42 While
these state practices differ from Australian and German case law, it
is unclear whether the evidentiary burden in more favorable
jurisdictions reaches the threshold advocated by UNHCR, which
includes both the end of a fear of persecution and proof of effective
national protection.
C. The "CompellingReasons" Exception to Mandatory Repatriation
The tension between a determination of refugee status based on
current fear of persecution and a continuation of status based on past
persecution is demonstrated in the exceptions to cessation. If an
asylum state applies the ceased circumstances provision to a group
and thereby mandates repatriation, UNHCR recommends the state
provide a method for reviewing the individual circumstances of a
refugee.143 At this stage, the focus is on the specific causes of an
individual's flight.144 The inquiry is twofold: first, whether the
documented change eliminated the risk of persecution and second,
45
whether national protection can replace international protection.1
The first step of the inquiry recognizes that a formal regime change

Id.
139.
Kneebone & O'Sullivan, supranote 11, at 526.
140.
141.
Id.
Id. at 527. Kneebone and O'Sullivan note that UNHCR's interpretation of
142.
the evidentiary burden required to invoke Article IC(5) is supported by many academic
commentators. Id.
GUIDELINES ON INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION, supra note 12, 1 25(vii)-(viii);
143.
Fitzpatrick & Bonoan, supra note 40, at 513. In group mandated repatriation, allowing
a forum to contest cessation helps ensure that states are not violating the Article 33
prohibition on nonrefoulement. 1951 Refugee Convention, supranote 5, art. 33(1).
GUIDELINES ON INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION, supra note 12, 1 25(ix); see
144.
37-45 (explaining the objective and
generally REFUGEE HANDBOOK, supra note 4,
subjective elements of a "well-founded fear of persecution").
19-21
See GUIDELINES ON INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION, supra note 12,
145.
(describing compelling reasons that negate a refugee's ability to return to the country
of origin).
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does not necessarily negate prejudices and the possibility that
146
If the
persecution will continue at the hands of non-state actors.
is
cessation
of
persecution,
fear
valid
a
end
not
does
change
regime
147
circumstances.
in
change
the
of
regardless
improper,
When a change in circumstances has alleviated the well-founded
fear of persecution, thereby satisfying the first prong of the inquiry,
UNHCR asks states to allow refugees to invoke the humanitarian
principle.148 Found in Article IC(5), this exception is limited to pre1939 refugees.' 4 9 UNHCR strongly recommends that states allow all
50
refugees the opportunity to apply for a continuation of status.1
Terming this exception "the humanitarian principle," a refugee
maintains his status, despite the host state's invocation of cessation,
if he can establish "compelling reasons arising out of previous
persecution for refusing to avail himself of the protection of his
country of nationality."115 Such reasons might include severe forms
15 2
The provision
of persecution that result in continuing trauma.
protects refugees who have suffered so greatly that they cannot be
53
UNHCR encourages
expected to return to their country of origin.1
states to apply this principle to current convention refugees on
humanitarian grounds.154 Several countries, including the United
States, Canada, and the Netherlands, adopted the humanitarian
principle into domestic legislation; other countries, notably France
and Germany, expressly declined to extend this principle to
convention refugees.155

146.

See REFUGEE HANDBOOK, supra note 4,

136 (noting that a formal regime

change does not ensure that all citizens have undergone the same change of mindset
toward the previously persecuted group).
Note on Cessation, supra note 31, T 19; Fitzpatrick & Bonoan, supra note
147.
40, at 517.
1951 Refugee Convention, supra note 5, art. IC(5); see also Hathaway,
148.
supra note 13, at 204-06 (arguing that UNHCR's interpretation of the text of the 1951
Refugee Convention is based on its own statutory interpretation, and therefore this
obligation is not required under the convention).
1951 Refugee Convention, supra note 5, art. 1C(5).
149.
150.

See VOLUNTARY REPATRIATION HANDBOOK, supra note 7, ch. 2.2 (noting

that individual refugees may continue to have a fear of persecution despite significant
24 (listing
changes in the country of origin); Note on Cessation, supra note 31,
examples of what might qualify as "compelling").
1951 Refugee Convention, supra note 5, art. 1A(a), C(5).
151.
Note on Cessation,supra note 31, 24.
152.
UNHCR Statement, supranote 33, § 2.3; Milner, supra note 16, at 94.
153.
154.

GUIDELINES ON INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION, supra note 12, T 21; see also

Milner, supra note 16, at 96 (noting the "Conclusions of the Lisbon Expert Roundtable"
found that extension of this humanitarian principle is "well grounded in state practice"
and applies to all Article 1A(2) refugees). However, UNHCR's recommendation of
socioeconomic factors is not explicitly included in the 1951 Refugee Convention. Id. at
103.

155.

Milner, supra note 16, at 97.
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David Milner highlights the tension between Article 1A(2), which
grants protection based on current risk, and this humanitarian
principle, which continues protection based on past persecution. 156
Milner seeks to reconcile this tension by focusing on the substitution
of the word "person" for "refugee."15 7 By using the term "person,"
UNHCR is acknowledging that protection for these individuals should
While Milner's
continue, but not formally as refugees. 5 8
reconciliation satisfies the formality of the instruments, the language
of the convention does not obligate states to consider this
humanitarian principle.159

VI. HARMONIZING MANDATORY REPATRIATION WITH
UNHCR's PRINCIPLE OF VOLUNTARY REPATRIATION
UNHCR guidelines and state practice can be understood to set
forth a timeline for repatriation that ensures the continued safety
and protection of the refugee. Beginning when refugee status is
conferred, UNHCR aids voluntary repatriation at the request of the
individual refugee.160 As the situation that initially caused flight
improves, UNHCR implements voluntary repatriation programs
directed at large groups of refugees.161 These voluntary repatriation
programs are indicators that states may consider activating the
cessation clause for individual refugees. 162 Mandated repatriation on
a group scale is the last stage, implemented after the fear of
persecution causing flight is extinguished and the evidentiary burden
established by UNHCR is satisfied.163 Group cessation carries the
highest evidentiary burden because it ceases international
protection.164 This timeline syncs these two legal foundations and

156.
See id. at 95, 99-104 (identifying three rationales for this exception:
breaking of the social contract, psychological damage, and a socioeconomic obstacle to
return).
157.
Id. at 95.
158.
Id.
159.
Hathaway, supra note 13, at 204-06.
160.
See VOLUNTARY REPATRIATION HANDBOOK, supra note 7, ch. 3.1. UNHCR
outlines the reasoning behind UNHCR's stages for voluntary repatriation. UNHCR
notes that from the onset of a refugee crisis, the organization begins addressing the
crisis through political avenues and relief on the ground.
161.
Id. Terming these measures "promotion of repatriation," UNHCR
distinguishes these group programs from its role in facilitating repatriation at the
individual refugee's request.
162.

GUIDELINES ON INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION, supra note 12,

163.

1951 Refugee Convention, supra note 5, art. 1C(5)-(6).

12.

164.

Cf. GUIDELINES ON INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION, supra note 12,

6-7

(discussing cessation in conjunction with the need to provide durable solutions for
6; UNHCR Statement, supra note 33,
refugees); Note on Cessation, supra note 31,
§ 4.2.1 (asserting that the concept of protection is broader than merely an absence of
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their explanatory documents in a linear development that reflects the
progress of change in the country of origin and guarantees that the
refugee is never without protection.
Understanding
voluntary
repatriation
and
mandated
repatriation to form a continuum that is dependent on changes in the
country of origin unites UNHCR's institutional mandate, conventionbased repatriation, and the overarching goals of refugee law. When
UNHCR manages repatriations, it operates in line with its statutory
requirement to implement only voluntary repatriation. 165
As
established earlier, UNHCR will facilitate repatriation at the
individual refugee's request even if it does not think the situation is
objectively safe for returns. 166 UNHCR-facilitated individual,
voluntary returns alone cannot be taken as authoritative indicators
that a fundamental change has occurred in the country of origin.
UNHCR promotes voluntary repatriation on a larger scale when
it determines that returns can take place in safety and with
dignity.16 7 This standard-"in safety and with dignity"-requires
that the legal status of returning refugees is secure under national
law.168 When UNHCR determines that conditions have improved
such that national protection is sufficient and refugees will thrive
upon return, transition from a management to return model is
appropriate. 169 At this stage of investigation, the inquiry moves
beyond merely assessing whether a fear of persecution has ceased to
considering other human rights concerns. 1 70 UNHCR properly roots
this obligation in other human rights norms to ensure that it is not
violating international law and returning vulnerable people to unsafe
situations.171

persecution-adequate state protection should not rely on non-state actors, including
international organizations).
165.
UNHCR Statute, supra note 6, I
1, 8(c) (stating that UNHCR must
"facilitate" voluntary repatriation and assist government efforts to "promote" voluntary
repatriation). Hathaway notes that UNHCR operates as if it is authorized to effect only
voluntary repatriation. Hathaway, supranote 13, at 192.
166.
VOLUNTARY REPATRIATION HANDBOOK, supra note 7, ch. 3.1. UNHCR will
facilitate returns at the request of individual refugees to return to unsafe situations
based on the right to return guaranteed in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.
Id. ch. 2.1.
167.
Id. chs. 2.4, 3.1.
168.
See id. ch. 4.1 (noting that misrepresentation of legal status negates the
voluntary nature of the return); see also Note on Cessation, supra note 31, 1 6 (stating
that cessation should not result in refugees losing all legal status).
169.
See generally VOLUNTARY REPATRIATION HANDBOOK, supra note 7, ch. 3
(describing the stages of voluntary repatriation).
170.
See id. ch. 2.1 (discussing the right to return and its relation to other
fundamental human rights).
171.
Id.; see also Note on Cessation, supra note 31, 6 (discussing the object and
purpose of cessation clauses in conjunction with the principles of refugee protection).
But see Hathaway, supra note 13, at 208-09 (arguing that UNHCR should articulate
the connection with other human rights instruments more clearly).
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As UNHCR and state parties have recognized, revoking
international protection without the consent of the refugee places the
burden on the state seeking to terminate status to prove that fear of
persecution has ceased and that international protection is no longer
necessary. 72 This evidentiary burden is very high, as demonstrated
by the fundamental, durable, and effective protection standards
required. 7 3 Though the case law from Australia and Germany seems
contrary to UNHCR's timeline, those cases involved individual status
determinations.17 4 When mandating repatriation to an entire group
of refugees, multiple legal obligations are acting upon states. First,
the duty of nonrefoulement in Article 33, interpreted with the
"change in circumstances" necessary in Article IC(5), requires that
the "well-founded" fear of persecution based on convention criteria
has ceased.' 75 Second, host states must satisfy other international
human rights obligations to which they are parties in addition to the
1951 Refugee Convention.1 76 State practice supports incorporating
these human rights principles into an inquiry of status
determination.' 7 7 UNHCR materials can be understood to encode
Therefore, while
these international human rights obligations.
UNHCR materials are not legal per se, the guidelines reflect duties
host states may have under international human rights law.1 78
Reading UNHCR guidelines to create a timeline of repatriation,
and placing voluntary and mandatory repatriation on this continuum,
clarifies UNHCR's interpretation of states' obligations under the 1951
UNHCR's continual advocacy of solely
Refugee Convention.
voluntary repatriation complicates the standards for states
UNHCR may facilitate
implementing mandated repatriation. 7 9
voluntary repatriation efforts long before conditions have changed to

172.
Kneebone & O'Sullivan, supra note 11, at 526; UNHCR Statement, supra
note 33, § 2.1.
173.
See VOLUNTARY REPATRIATION HANDBOOK, supra note 7, ch. 2.2. The
voluntary nature of the refugee's decision to return is a key justification for this lower
evidentiary requirement. Accordingly, UNHCR places a great emphasis on ensuring
that a refugee's decision is truly voluntary and not caused by a hostile environment in
the host country. Id. ch. 2.3.
174.
Kneebone & O'Sullivan, supra note 11, at 514-16.
175.
1951 Refugee Convention, supra note 5, art. 33; see generally REFUGEE
37-45 (noting that a "well-founded fear of persecution"
HANDBOOK, supra note 4,
includes a refugee's own perception as well as the context of the country of origin).
176.

See VOLUNTARY REPATRIATION HANDBOOK, supra note 7, ch. 2.1 (giving

examples of human rights norms activated during cessation).
Kneebone & O'Sullivan, supra note 11, at 526; see also text accompanying
177.
notes 140, 172.
For a discussion of applicable human rights norms, see Hathaway, supra
178.
note 13, at 208-11. Hathaway disagrees that international human rights law places as
high a burden on host states. Id. at 212.
179.
Id. at 199.
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a degree that supports mandated repatriation. 18 0 However, when
UNHCR has begun to promote voluntary repatriation, states have
taken this action as a signal that their duties as asylum states are
This timeline places UNHCR-facilitated voluntary
fulfilled.1 8 '
repatriation as a necessary, but not sufficient, benchmark toward
group, mandated repatriation. Host states have an affirmative
obligation to investigate and evaluate a change in circumstances. 182
At the beginning of the analysis, this Note recognized that
UNHCR materials, while authoritative, are not the sole means of
interpreting the 1951 Refugee Convention. State practice sets
standards in understanding what is required under international
law. James Hathaway notes that UNHCR, in an effort to raise
humanitarian standards, may actually contribute to their erosion by
not acknowledging states' ability to end refugee status.18 3 UNHCR
can proactively contribute to the development of international law by
encouraging states to adhere to the high evidentiary standard when
mandating repatriation.
VII. RWANDAN REFUGEES IN UGANDA
As set forth above, tension exists between the UNHCR
requirement to implement voluntary repatriation and a state's ability
to mandate repatriation under the 1951 Refugee Convention. These
conflicting standards are demonstrated by the actions of UNHCR,
Uganda, and Rwanda in facilitating repatriation and determining the
end of refugee status.

180.
See generally VOLUNTARY REPATRIATION HANDBOOK, supra note 7, ch. 3.1
(explaining "essential preconditions" for promotion of repatriation). UNHCR states that
it will facilitate repatriation at the request of the refugee before the standard to
implement the cessation clause has been reached. Note on Cessation, supra note 31,
29.
Hathaway, supra note 13, at 193. UNHCR states that large-scale
181.
repatriation can be a factor states consider when determining whether a fundamental
29. For a discussion of the
change has occurred. Note on Cessation, supra note 31,
current confusion of these two evidentiary burdens, see Hathaway, supra note 13, at
199-200.
See, e.g., GUIDELINES ON INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION, supra note 12, 25
182.
(noting that the burden should be on the country of asylum to prove change in the
country of origin).
Hathaway, supra note 13, at 199. Additionally, UNHCR's Handbook on
183.
Voluntary Repatriation instructs host states to follow UNHCR's lead in promoting
voluntary repatriation. VOLUNTARY REPATRIATION HANDBOOK, supranote 7, ch. 2.5.
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A. Background of Rwandan Refugees in Uganda
In April 1994, Rwanda disintegrated into violence. 184 Hutus, the
ethnic majority in Rwanda, began attacking Tutsis in a systematic
and organized campaign of murder.1 85 An estimated 800,000 Tutsis
were murdered over the course of four months. 18 6 Following the
genocide, millions of Rwandans fled to neighboring countries.18 7
UNHCR has been assisting the voluntary repatriation of Rwandan
refugees since 1995.188

Currently, 60,000-65,000 Rwandan refugees live in asylum
countries, 189 and 16,300 reside in Uganda.1 9 0 Host countries in this
region have not always been hospitable. In 1996, Tanzania forced the
return of tens of thousands of Rwandan refugees. 19 1 The government
of Burundi.pursued a similar strategy in 2005, forcibly returning over
6,000 Rwandan refugees. 192 These states demonstrated no proof that
they had undertaken efforts to establish a change in circumstances,
as UNHCR maintains is mandated by the 1951 Refugee
Convention.19 3
In 2003, Uganda began advocating the cessation of refugee
status for all Rwandan refugees, 19 4 and in July of that year, Uganda,
Rwanda, and UNHCR signed a tripartite agreement for the voluntary
repatriation of the over 23,000 Rwandan refugees living in
Uganda.19 5 The terms of the agreement provided that Rwandans
may return to Rwanda without satisfying any preconditions, and no
refugee will be forced to return.196 Subsequently, UNHCR began

184.
Mark A. Drumbl, Punishment, Postgenocide: From Guilt to Shame to Civis
in Rwanda, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1221, 1222 (2000).
185.
Id. at 1223.
186.
Id. at 1222.
187.
David Nthengwe, UNHCR and Rwanda Seek Enduring Solution for
Protracted Refugee Situation, UNHCR-UN REFUGEE AGENCY (Oct. 20, 2009),
http://www.unhcr.org/4addd7fd9.html.
Id.
188.
189.
Id.
190.
UNHCR, Uganda, in GLOBAL APPEAL UPDATE 84, 84-87 (2011) [hereinafter
Uganda Needs Assessment], available at http://www.unhcr.org/4cd969139.html.
191.
Lori A. Nessel, Rape and Recovery in Rwanda: The Viability of Local
Justice Initiatives and the Availability of Surrogate State Protection for Women that
Flee, 15 MICH. ST. J. INT'L L. 101, 126 (2007).
192.
Tanzania/ Uganda: Prevent Forced Return of Refugees, HUMAN RIGHTS
WATCH (June 19, 2009), http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2009/06/19/tanzaniaugandaprevent-forced-return-refugees.
See, e.g., Nessel, supra note 191, at 126 (discussing state behavior
193.
inconsistent with obligations under the 1951 Refugee Convention).
194.
Uganda: Tripartite Agreement Signed on Return of Rwandans, UNHCRUN REFUGEE AGENCY (July 25, 2003), http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/search?
[hereinafter Uganda
page=search&docid=3f20fbe2c&query=rwanda%20repatriation
TripartiteAgreement].
Id.
195.
196.
Id.
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promoting voluntary repatriation.1 9 7 In April 2009, UNHCR met
with the governments of Rwanda and Uganda to discuss the
continued repatriation of Rwandan refugees.19 8 UNHCR and both
governments agreed that continuing refugee status for Rwandans
living in Uganda was no longer necessary.' 9 9 UNHCR set a goal for
ending Rwanda's protracted refugee problem by 2011.200
NGOs expressed concern that the repatriation advocated by
The Refugee Law Project,
UNHCR would be involuntary. 2 01
reporting on ReliefWeb, urged UNHCR to clarify the voluntary
nature of repatriation and to educate refugees on protection options if
they did not wish to return. 202 The lack of consideration for
individual circumstances and alternative durable solutions was
particularly concerning.20 3 Reports of the April 2009 meeting do not
include any reference to investigation by Uganda into the changed
circumstances in Rwanda. 204
UNHCR originally set a July 31, 2009, benchmark for
repatriation before camps closed.20o In May 2009, news reports
documented that Rwandan refugees living in camps in Uganda had
begun to flee, fearing forced repatriation. 206 Among the reasons cited
for wanting to remain in Uganda included fear of persecution and
Refugees caught fleeing were
imprisonment upon return. 207
Confronting these reports, UNHCR repeated that
arrested.20 8
repatriation was voluntary and that UNHCR would still provide aid
to those remaining in the camps. 209
In June 2009, Human Rights Watch urged the government of
Uganda to educate Rwandan refugees, before the camps closed in
July, on their protection under international law. 210 Although the
tripartite agreement pledges that Uganda will provide alternative

UNHCR Mounts Campaign for Return of 80,000 Rwandan Refugees,
197.
UNHCR-UN REFUGEE AGENCY (Nov. 6, 2003), http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/
search?page=search&docid=3faa72027&query=rwanda%20repatriation.
Memorandum from Chris Dolan, Dir., Refugee Law Project on Rwandese
198.
Repatriation (May 15, 2009) [hereinafter Rwandese Repatriation Memo], available at
http://reliefweb.int/node/312404.
199.
Id.
200.
UNHCR, Rwanda, in GLOBAL APPEAL UPDATE 34, 34-38 (2011) [hereinafter
Rwanda Global Appeal], availableat http://www.unhcr.org/pages/49e45c576.html.
Rwandese Repatriation Memo, supra note 198.
201.
Id.
202.
Id.
203.
Id.
204.
205.
Rwanda-Uganda: Refugees Leave Camps Fearing Repatriation,
INTEGRATED

REGIONAL

INFO.

NETWORKS,

May

14,

2009,

available

http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/country,,,,RWA,456d62 1e2,4aObdbc8l9,0.html.
206.
Id.
207.
Id.
208.
Id.
209.
Id.
Tanzania/Uganda:Prevent Forced Return of Refugees, supra note 192.
210.

at
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solutions for refugees who were unwilling to repatriate,2 11 Uganda
2 12
had taken no affirmative steps to provide alternative solutions.
213
Refugees continued to flee, fearing forced repatriation.
The July 2009 deadline was subsequently extended to August 31,
2009.214 Reports from August document the Rwandan government
threatening to revoke citizenship of refugees who had not returned by
A Rwandan government official was quoted:
that deadline. 215
"[Rwanda] shall apply the secession [sic] clause if they have returned
by the end of December, there is no more reason for any Rwandan to
2 17
become a refugee." 21 6 However, as of 2010, camps remained open.
Uganda continued to force returns in spite the public condemnation
from UNHCR.2 18 In one incident, two men died jumping from trucks
as Ugandan police attempted to drive refugees across the Rwandan
border. 219
In its 2011 country report on Rwanda, UNHCR described the
domestic political situation as "relatively stable," with pockets of
Rwanda frequently
unrest during the presidential election. 220
requests that UNHCR invoke the cessation clause, ending
international protection of refugees. 221 UNHCR reiterates the goal of
invoking its statutory clause by the end of 2011.222 Until then,
UNHCR will continue to promote the voluntary repatriation of
Rwandan refugees. 2 23

211.
Id.
212.
Id.
Id.
213.
Rwanda-Uganda:Repatriation Deadline Extended, INTEGRATED REGIONAL
214.
INFO. NETWORKS, Aug. 10, 2009, available at: http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/
4a85177b2c.html.
Rwanda/Uganda: Go Home, Uganda Tells Rwandan Refugees,
215.
INTEGRATED REGIONAL INFO. NETWORKS, Aug. 4, 2009 [hereinafter Go Home],
at
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/country,,,,RWA,456d621e2,4a7fcc92c,
available
0.html.
Id. This quote reflects a fundamental misunderstanding of international
216.
law. As the country of origin, Rwanda has no authority to invoke the cessation clause.
See Ben Simon, Rwanda Refugees Pushed to Return to a Home They Consider Unsafe,
CHRISTIAN SCl. MONITOR, July 30, 2009, http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Africa/2009/
0730/p06s04-woaf.html (noting that the desire to invoke the clause stems from national
pride).
Rwanda Global Appeal, supra note 200.
217.
UNHCR Condemns Forced Return of 1,700 Rwandans from Uganda,
218.
UNHCR-UN REFUGEE AGENCY (July 16, 2010), http://www.unhcr.org/4c4O6edb6.html
[hereinafter UNHCR Condemns].
219.
Id.
220.
Rwanda Global Appeal, supra note 200.
221.
Id.; see, e.g., Go Home, supra note 212 (quoting Rwandan official expressing
desire to invoke cessation clause).
222.
Rwanda Global Appeal, supra note 200.
223.
Id.
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B. Comparing UNHCR Promotion of Voluntary Repatriation
of Rwandan Refugees with UNHCR Guidelines
UNHCR has stated that in order to promote voluntary
repatriation, the situation in the country of origin must have
improved to an extent that refugees can return in safety and with
dignity. 224 Regarding legal and physical safety, Rwanda worked with
UNHCR in providing assistance, including mediating land
disputes, 225 and it has pledged to receive any Rwandan who wishes to
return. 226 UNHCR notes that border skirmishes may challenge
repatriation, but not prevent efforts. 22 7 The tripartite agreement
signed by UNHCR, Rwanda, and Uganda agrees to voluntary returns
and UNHCR's continual role in resettlement.2 28 These facts, in
addition to the advances in governance noted below, support the
initiation of voluntary repatriation programs.2 29
However, the scarcity of land and lack of resources caution
against initiating large-scale voluntary repatriation programs.
Returnees' ability to thrive seems uncertain, given the lack of land
and livelihood programs.2 30 UNHCR notes that refugee households
are dependent on UNHCR assistance for their survival. 23 1 Just as
the presence of multinational forces calls into question a state's
ability to provide sufficient
protection, 23 2 dependence
on
multinational aid and assistance for basic survival challenges the
ability of the state to ensure the material security of returnees.
Additionally, Uganda's actions raise significant questions about
whether returns would actually be voluntary. The process by which
Uganda has gone about closing camps-including the lack of notice,
inability for individual review, abrupt closing of camps, and
destruction of homes-indicates that these returns are coerced.23 3

224.
VOLUNTARY REPATRIATION HANDBOOK, supra note 7, ch. 3.1.
225.
U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND LABOR,
2009 HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT: RWANDA (2010), available at http://www.state.gov/g/drl/
rls/hrrpt/2009/af/135971.htm.
226.
Nthengwe, supra note 187.
227.
See Rwanda Global Appeal, supra note 200 (noting that military operations
and political uncertainty in the eastern parts of the DRC may hamper the voluntary
repatriation of refugees from Rwanda).
228.
Uganda TripartiteAgreement, supra note 194.
229.
See supra Part III; see generally VOLUNTARY REPATRIATION HANDBOOK,
supra note 7, ch. 3 (outlining changes that support implementing the promotion of
voluntary repatriation programs).
230.
Rwanda Global Appeal, supra note 200.

231.

Id.

232.
UNHCR Statement, supra note 33, § 4.2.1.
233.
See VOLUNTARY REPATRIATION HANDBOOK, supra note 7, ch. 2.3 (noting
that physical, psychological, or material pressure from the host country negates the
voluntariness of returns); GUIDELINES ON INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION, supra note 12,
25(vi) (requiring that a gap of time occur between declaration of cessation and
subsequent facilitation of returns).
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Invoking its statutory cessation clause in this circumstance seems
contrary to UNHCR's own standards given the demonstrated lack of
national protection, continued regional instability, and involuntary
returns.

C. Evaluating Uganda'sActions Under UNHCR Guidelines
and the Precedent of State Practice
In determining whether Uganda's forced repatriation of
Rwandan refugees violates the 1951 Refugee Convention, UNHCR
materials and state jurisprudence provide insight. Following the
timeline model, mandated repatriation should only be implemented
after UNHCR has begun large-scale voluntary repatriation programs
and an intensive investigation occurs. Using the UNHCR guidelines
in evaluating whether a fundamental, durable change that provides
effective protection has occurred over the last fifteen years requires
inquiry into the political, economic, and social structures of current
Rwandan society. 234 Since Uganda has taken steps to forcibly return
refugees, compliance with UNHCR standards ensures that they are
not in breach of the Article 33 nonrefoulement prohibition of the 1951
Refugee Convention.2 35
1.

Fundamental Change

Fundamental changes eliminate the fear of persecution that
caused flight. 236 These changes usually involve an end to hostilities
and a political change resulting in peace and stability.2 3 7 UNHCR
reports regarding advances in governance are particularly promising
for Rwanda. 238 Recent elections were peaceful and the political
situation remains relatively stable. 2 39 In 2010, the government
established the Ministry of Disaster Management and Refugee
Affairs to provide assistance for refugees within Rwanda and to

234.
See UNHCR Statement, supra note 33, § 4.1 (providing references for
requirements for change used by UNHCR).
UNHCR guidelines include establishing that a fear of persecution has
235.
ceased and national protection is sufficient, therefore mandating repatriation after
satisfying these requirements necessarily means that states are not in violation of their
Article 33 requirements. See Hathaway, supra note 13, at 179 ("[B]ecause repatriation
of the former refugee cannot by definition involve a risk of refoulement . .. repatriation
does not require a former refugee's consent."). While Australia and Germany seem to
establish contrary evidentiary burdens, that case law reflects individual status
hearings and not group mandated repatriation. Kneebone & O'Sullivan, supra note 11,
at 514-16.
236.

See GUIDELINES ON INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION, supra note 12,

(discussing character and duration of change required).
237.
Id. 1 11.
Rwanda Global Appeal, supra note 200.
238.
239.
Id.

11
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facilitate returns. 240 Additionally, the Rwandan Parliament recently
passed a gender law addressing equality at all sectors of society and
the economic independence of women. 241
It remains unclear whether this progress truly eliminates the
fear of persecution that Rwandan refugees face. In the aftermath of
the genocide, many Hutus fled to Uganda fearing persecution for acts
of genocide. 24 2 They remain hesitant to return, afraid of harassment
by the current government. 24 3 Reports on Rwanda's progress remain
mixed. The U.S. Department of State documents government efforts
to eliminate ethnic references in government materials, and it has
abolished the quota system. 244 The Rwandan Constitution calls for
the promotion of national unity over ethnic distinctions.24 5 However,
success remains uncertain, and discrimination continues. 246
2.

Durable Change

Evaluations of durability assess whether the changes
documented above are sustainable. 247
UNHCR reports positive
strides in the development of governance in Rwanda. 24 8 However,
respect for human rights and the continuance of peace and security
are in question, and protection of general human rights remains
tenuous. 249 The legal system in Rwanda continues to garner much
criticism for selective prosecution, especially of genocide crimes. 250
Defense witnesses testifying in front of the International Criminal
Tribunal for Rwanda do not travel to Rwanda, because their safety
cannot be guaranteed by the United Nations.2 5 ' While the gacaca
courts (local courts) have made positive strides in reconciling
communities, the situation is far from one of nondiscrimination and
freedom from fear of persecution. 252

240.
Id.
241.
Id.
242.
Simon, supra note 216; see generally Go Home, supra note 215 (discussing
efforts by Uganda and Rwanda to get refugees to return to Rwanda); Nthengwe, supra
note 187 (discussing flight of Rwandans).
243.
Simon, supra note 216; see, e.g., Go Home, supra note 215 (discussing
refugee fears).
244.
See U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, supra note 225.
245.
Id.
246.
Id.
247.
See discussion supra Part IV (explaining the cessation clause and relevant
UNHCR guidelines).
248.
Rwanda Global Appeal, supra note 200.
249.
See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, Rwanda, in WORLD REPORT (2011), available at
http://www.hrw.org/en/world-report-201 1/rwanda.
250.
George Norris, Closer to Justice: Transferring Cases from the International
Criminal Court, 19 MINN. J. INT'L L. 201, 214-15 (2010).
251.
Id. at 214.
252.
Id.; see generally HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, LAW AND REALITY: PROGRESS IN
JuDIcIAL REFORM IN RWANDA (2008), available at http://www.hrw.org/en/reports/2008/
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Additionally, the government has twice invaded neighboring
Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) to fight Hutu forces.2 53
Rwandan armed forces just withdrew from the DRC border in March
2009.254 The lack of protection for human rights and prevalence of
border skirmishes draw the durability of progress into question. As
noted above, many refugees are afraid to return because they believe
the Rwandan government will persecute them based on their
ethnicity.2 5 5 This fear, combined with recent military activity against
Hutu militia, arguably establishes the lack of a fundamental change.
3.

Effective Protection

Lastly, Uganda must. evaluate whether the Rwandan
government can adequately protect its citizens, ending the need for
international protection. 2 56 In addition to advances in governance
and legal safety, UNHCR requires that refugees have access to
livelihoods. 25 7 In its 2011 country assessment of Rwanda, UNHCR
notes that the majority of refugee households in Rwanda remain
dependent on UNHCR support. 258 Rwanda is not providing for its
own citizens residing in domestic camps. 259 "The returnees face
extreme poverty, as well as land and shelter issues, lack of medical
coverage, a dearth of job opportunities, and the need to walk long
distances in search of water." 260 Land is scarce, and other citizens
have claimed homes abandoned by refugees. 261
The principles of refugee protection include alleviating the
immediate crisis and seeking durable solutions. 262 In the context of
cessation, durable solutions involve ensuring refugees have stable
legal status and are not returned to a volatile situation. 263 Forcing
involuntary returns increases the chance that such refugees will flee

07/24/law-and-reality-O (examining changes to Rwanda's judicial system from 2004 to
2008).
253.
Rwanda: How the Genocide Happened, BBC, Dec. 18, 2008,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hil1288230.stm.
254.
UNHCR Helps Rwandan Civilians Return Home, UNHCR-UN REFUGEE
AGENCY (Mar. 9, 2009), http://www.unhcr.org/49b549cd2.html.
255.
Simon, supra note 216; see generally Nthengwe, supra note 187 (discussing
flight of Rwandans); Go Home, supranote 215 (discussing ethnic tensions).
256.
Note on Cessation, supra note 31, 6.
257.

GUIDELINES ON INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION, supra note 12,

15; see also

UNHCR Statement, supra note 33, §§ 4.2.1, 4.2.3 (noting minimum standard of living
requirements).
258.
Rwanda Global Appeal, supranote 200.
259.
Id.
260.
Id.
261.
Simon, supra note 216.
262.
Note on Cessation, supra note 31,
19, 28 (discussing the central role of
the "durable solution" in repatriation programs).
263.
Id. T 28.
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again, causing additional instability in regions that have recently
begun recovering from conflict. 264

D. Recommended Action
UNHCR creates a timeline for repatriation that ensures the
continued safety and protection of the refugee, beginning with
individual voluntary repatriation and ending in the cessation of
status. 265 Uganda's actions have disrupted this timeline, drawing the
safety of Rwandan refugees into question. Given UNHCR's task to
"provide permanent solutions," supporting voluntary repatriation in
this case may be preferred over local integration or third country
resettlement. 266 Resettlement in Uganda does not seem to be a viable
option, as demonstrated by attacks and forcible returns.2 6 7 Moreover,
Uganda has demonstrated a willingness to violate its obligations
Instituting voluntary
under the 1951 Refugee Convention. 268
repatriation programs in this environment may be the best solution
from a pool of less than ideal options. If Uganda continues to close
camps and effectively mandate repatriation, Rwandans remaining in
Uganda may have no legal status. 269 Decreased access to refugees
limits UNHCR's ability to educate refugees about their rights,
ensuring that the decision to return is voluntary. 2 70 This limitation
also truncates UNHCR's ability to organize orderly returns. In
addition, food supply to the camps is inconsistent and necessary items
are often lacking. 271 Facilitating voluntary repatriation may provide
more protection and security than advocating continued asylum.
According to the timeline set forth in UNHCR materials, Uganda
may be in breach of its duty of nonrefoulement under the 1951

Id.
264.
265.
See VOLUNTARY REPATRIATION HANDBOOK, supra note 7, ch. 3.1 (discussing
the UNHCR goals of facilitating and promoting repatriation). The overarching goal of
cessation is providing a durable solution. Given that mandatory cessation does not
require consent and terminates refugee status, the risks are greater and therefore,
should be undertaken cautiously. GUIDELINES ON INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION, supra
note 12, 1$ 6-7.
See UNHCR Statement, supra note 33, § 2.1 ("The 'ceased circumstances'
266.
clause should . . . not result in uncertain status in the host State nor compel
individuals to return to a volatile situation.").
See generally Simon, supra note 216 (discussing recent violence); UNHCR
267.
Condemns, supra note 218.
268.
See 1951 Refugee Convention, supra note 5, art. 33(1). The principle of
nonrefoulement prohibits Uganda from forcibly returning refugees when their life or
freedom is threatened on account of race (among other designations).
UNHCR cautions states against creating this situation. See Note on
269.
Cessation, supra note 31, T 6 (noting that countries should avoid leaving refugees in
the country of asylum without a definite legal status or with an illegal status).
VOLUNTARY REPATRIATION HANDBOOK, supra note 7, ch. 3.1.
270.
Uganda Needs Assessment, supra note 190.
271.
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Refugee Convention. 272 Although changes have occurred in Rwanda's
system of governance, it is not certain that these changes are durable
and eliminated the fear that caused flight. By July 2010, 3,320
Rwandans in Uganda had filed for asylum, and 98 percent of the
applications were denied. 273 This indicates that Uganda is not
adequately considering individual cases. 274 If Uganda continues to
pressure for mandated repatriation in the absence of an independent
investigation into the current stability of Rwanda, the government of
Uganda may be in violation of international law. 275 To satisfy its
obligations under the 1951 Refugee Convention, 2 76 Uganda can either
undertake an investigation determining whether the original cause of
flight has ceased2 77 or allow Rwandan refugees to remain in
Uganda. 278

VIII. CONCLUSION

According to UNHCR, Article 1C(5) and (6) of the 1951 Refugee
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees gives asylum states
such as Uganda the authority to mandate repatriation when the
country of origin has made fundamental, durable, and stable changes
that end refugees' fear of persecution. In comparison, UNHCR can
facilitate voluntary returns at a much lower threshold of change. As
this Note demonstrates, these two legal standards are not concentric.
Rather, these standards form a timeline of repatriation, starting at
voluntary individual repatriation and ending in cessation of status.
This timeline ensures international protection remains constant until
national protection can resume and reconciles the ability to mandate
repatriation with states' duty of nonrefoulement.
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